Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life: A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu
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Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life : A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu. / Christiansen, Andreas.
I: Bioethics, Bind 30, Nr. 5, 11.05.2016, s. 372-379.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Synthetic biology and the moral significance of artificial life
T2 - A reply to Douglas, Powell and Savulescu
AU - Christiansen, Andreas
PY - 2016/5/11
Y1 - 2016/5/11
N2 - I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable.
AB - I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails to take into account the possibility that creating artificial life is conditionally acceptable. Finally, I show how several important objections to synthetic biology are plausibly understood as arguing that creating artificial life in a wide sense is only conditionally acceptable.
UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bioe.12248/abstract
U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12248
DO - 10.1111/bioe.12248
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 26833578
VL - 30
SP - 372
EP - 379
JO - Bioethics
JF - Bioethics
SN - 0269-9702
IS - 5
ER -
ID: 149033048