Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion
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As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Analytic Philosophy |
Vol/bind | 63 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 174-191 |
Antal sider | 18 |
ISSN | 2153-9596 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2022 |
ID: 260542589