Mental activity and the sense of ownership

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Dokumenter

  • Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith
I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Vol/bind6
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)881-896
Antal sider16
ISSN1878-5158
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015

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