How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise

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In an influential paper, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the paper is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftPolitics, Philosophy & Economics
Vol/bind17
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)75-96
Antal sider22
ISSN1470-594X
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2018

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